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Abstract 
The principle of non-intervention is part of customary international law; its foundation is based upon the concept 
of respect for the territorial sovereignty of states. It is a principle Nigeria cherished and pursued from the 
moment she gained her independence in 1960.  But surprisingly, over time, the illegality of intervening in 
sovereign states has changed, as measured by changes in international law. In recent years, international law has 
adopted an increasingly permissive posture toward this form of coercive diplomacy. How did Nigeria respond to 
these changes? Why should sub-regional concerns lend to Nigeria’s apparent willingness to violate its 
longstanding principle of non-interference? It is in the attempt to examine Nigeria’s application of diplomatic 
and military power- two instruments of its foreign policy - that necessitated this study. It is a study that reveals 
the cluttered deployment of Nigeria’s coercive forces.  
Keywords: Diplomacy, Warfare, Foreign Policy, Intervention, Peacekeeping, Terrorism       
 
1. Introduction: The Unholy Wedlock of Diplomacy and Warfare 
The relationship between the statesman and the soldier is as old as the organized government. Yet, despite the 
timelessness of this relationship and the best intentions of individual men and women, the statesman and the 
soldier, on many occasions, fail fully to understand each other and, at times, even seem to work at cross-
purposes. Theirs is a complicated interaction of two very different tools of foreign policy. While the diplomat 
relies on her powers of negotiation and the art of compromise to achieve her objectives, her counterpart, the 
soldier, usually achieves objectives through the application or threatened use of force. Both know they need the 
other to succeed as the American President, James Madison, once postulated that war is needed to guarantee the 
continuation of peace: 
                            Experience has taught us that neither the pacific dispositions of the American people nor the 
pacific character of their political institutions can altogether exempt them from that strife which 
appears beyond the ordinary lot of nations to be incident to the actual period of the world, and 
the same faithful monitor demonstrates that a certain degree of preparation for war is not only 
indispensable to avert disasters in the onset, but affords also the best security for the continuance 
of peace (Madison 1815).    
Political literature delivers many examples for the existence of a close relationship between diplomacy and the 
use of military force. These tools of foreign policy have enabled governments to press their agendas onto other 
states. As diplomacy plays a part in verbal communication, military action aims to communicate other nations 
that any resistance to proposed agendas would never be tolerated. Nevertheless, it seems like the time of coercive 
diplomacy has gone as most states now appreciate that dialogue and cooperation are a real source of power. 
Nowadays, diplomacy is perceived as a peaceful alternative to violence. However, opinions are divided between 
those who believe that the world of diplomacy has matured and those who see the use of military force as 
inseparable from diplomatic environment. Under this setting, diplomacy has never changed and may probably 
never change. For instance, humanitarian interventions are still labeled in coercive terms (Kegley 2007: 477-8) 
though their aim is to help molested civilians. Use of force among states has intolerable consequences.  
Through the use of force, some states try to make others act in a way they would never have done. This applies 
not only in humanitarian interventions but also to wars against terrorism. In all of these cases, national 
sovereignty is challenged by extraneous forces. Indeed, this type of diplomacy can eliminate conflicts as well as 
it can create them. Invariably, the marriage between diplomacy and the use of military force will continue as 
nations are confronted with conflict management. To understand their shared responsibilities and how they form 
effective relationships, this study will seek to answer the following questions: What are the guiding principles of 
Nigeria’s foreign policy? How has Nigeria reacted to conflict situations, particularly among and within its sub-
regional domain? To what extent has Nigeria employed force and diplomacy in the resolution of such conflicts? 
Besides its immediate neighbours, how has Nigeria engaged diplomacy and military overtures to secure its 
national interest in the wider world, particularly through UN sponsored peace keeping operations? This study 
demonstrates that diplomacy and military actions are fundamental instruments of Nigeria’s foreign policy. 
Though they are not mutually exclusive and have been used in advancing the national interests of many nations, 
the same cannot be said of Nigeria. While rich nations put their muscle in peacekeeping where their immediate 
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interests lie, Nigeria has not been guided with relevant policy. It is against this backdrop that some conceptual 
clarifications of foreign policy and diplomacy follow right away. 
1.1. Conceptual Clarifications 
Different scholars have over the years forwarded different definitions of foreign policy which employs tools that 
include but are not limited to diplomacy and warfare. However, without counting on the differences, foreign 
policy has a common denominator that involves a course of action or set of principles adopted by a state to 
realize its national interests in the external environment. Put differently, it is simply the totality of objectives that 
guide the activities and relationships of a state in its interactions with other states. It has to do with decisions and 
actions which involve, to an appreciable extent, the relationship between one state and another. A country’s 
foreign policy may reflect broad national objectives or represent a narrow and specific response to a particular 
situation.  
The main purpose of foreign policy is to further a state's interests; a state can achieve its foreign policy goals in 
several ways. It can use diplomacy which may involve peaceful negotiations with other countries. In this 
diplomatic stance, economic actions such as giving money or other aids to another country may be involved; or it 
can restrict trade with that nation or impose economic sanctions on it. Beside diplomacy, the state can also resort 
to military force. It is in all these contexts that foreign policy deals with strategies used by governments to guide 
their actions in the international arena. In a way, foreign policy can be described as the substance of foreign 
relations. Foreign policy has a lot of instruments that enhance its realization. In this study, the focus is on how 
diplomacy and military options had guided Nigeria’s foreign policy over the years.  
Diplomacy can simply be taken to mean non-violent means through which a state advances its foreign policy 
objectives. There are times diplomacy might be coercive (i.e., backed by the threat to apply punitive measures or 
to use force) but is overtly nonviolent. Many students of international relations see diplomacy as the established 
method of influencing the decisions and behaviours of foreign governments and peoples through dialogue, 
negotiation, and other measures short of war or violence. Traditionally, diplomacy meant the conduct of official 
(usually bilateral) relations between sovereign states. By the 20th century, diplomacy had expanded to cover 
summit meetings and other international conferences, parliamentary diplomacy, the international activities of 
supranational and sub-national entities, unofficial diplomacy by nongovernmental elements, and the work of 
international civil servants (Diplomacy. 2010). 
It must be appreciated that states take actions in international affairs for various reasons. Diplomats are 
appointed to positions, given instructions to foster the achievement of specific interests. Military forces are 
moved around and occasionally sent into the battlefield. Behind each of these actions are decisions by the state 
policy makers. These decisions in turn generally reflect the overall policies states have developed to govern 
relationships with other states. Diplomacy and military actions are fundamental instruments of the foreign policy 
process which states adopt to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Whereas all states may nourish similar 
foreign policy goals, their ability to realize them varies according to their military capabilities. Military 
capabilities limit a state’s range of prudent policy choices. They act as a mediating factor on leaders’ national 
security decisions, particularly in war-like situations (kegley 2007:60) War can be defined as a state of open and 
declared hostile armed conflict between states or nations or a period of such conflict. There is a symbiotic 
relationship between diplomacy and war as, Marks and Freeman observed, 
                        When diplomacy fails, war may ensue; however, diplomacy is useful even during war. It conducts 
the passages from protest to menace, dialogue to negotiation, ultimatum to reprisal, and war to 
peace and reconciliation with other states. Diplomacy builds and tends the coalitions that deter or 
make war. It disrupts the alliances of enemies and sustains the passivity of potentially hostile 
powers. It contrives war's termination, and it forms, strengthens, and sustains the peace that follows 
conflict. Over the long term, diplomacy strives to build an international order conducive to the 
nonviolent resolution of disputes and expanded cooperation between states (Marks & Freeman 
2010). 
The use of war and diplomacy in the conduct of international relations in post-World War 11 era is done under 
the auspices the United Nations Organization (UN). Thus, the UN has today come to symbolize the concept of 
multilateral conference diplomacy by which it can intervene in international conflicts. The parties to the conflict 
are also obliged, through Art 33, to submit their differences to some procedure for pacific settlement, ranging 
from bilateral negotiations to settlement through the judicial organ of the UN-the International Court of Justice. 
Nigeria has been involved in various military and diplomatic activities since its independence. This is not to say 
that Nigeria has been a belligerent state. Rather, she has been involved in various peace-keeping operations 
through the UN. In certain instances, Nigeria has militarily intervened in internal conflicts of other countries at 
least within the West African sub-region. The question then is what must have informed Nigeria’s military 
interventions in these operations? The answer could be found in the principles underlying Nigeria’s foreign 
policy.  
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2. Guiding Principles of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy  
Nigeria’s foreign policy should ordinarily reflect the country’s national interest. From 1960, following the 
country’s independence, certain principles have guided the country’s foreign policy and the pursuit of her 
interests both in her bilateral and multi-lateral relations. Barely a week after Nigeria’s independence from Great 
Britain, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister, in his maiden address to the 15th Session of the UN 
General Assembly (October 7, 1960) declared the following principles as guiding his country’s relation with 
other countries of the world: 
i. Maintenance of friendly relations with all nations and active participation in the work of the United 
Nations; 
ii. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of, and peaceful co-existence with all countries; 
iii. Development of cultural co-operation as a means of strengthening political ties with all African 
countries; and  
iv. Commitment to African peace, development and co-operation, decolonization and fight against racism 
and apartheid (Balewa 1960). 
These guiding principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy have remained largely intact despite regime changes. What 
is remarkable is that these principles have found their way into the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria which in no unmistakable manner spells out the key foreign policy objectives the nation must pursue on 
the world stage. Chapter 11, Section 19 (a-e) of the 1999 Constitution prescribes the following foreign policy 
objectives for the Nigerian state: 
a. Promotion and protection of the national interest; 
b. Promotion of African integration and support for African unity; 
c. Promotion of international cooperation, consolidation of peace, and elimination of discrimination in all 
its forms; 
d. Respect for international law and treaty obligations, as well seeking settlement of international disputes 
by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication; and  
e. Promotion of a just world economic order. 
These principles and the objectives are the ideals that today drive Nigeria’s foreign policy. These foreign policy 
principles and objectives account for the ostensible consistency and continuity that have characterized Nigeria’s 
external relations since independence. A country with values that includes peace, respect for territorial integrity 
of all nations and friendship among the entire world’s people, has set out on a higher road, less travelled by other 
nations. Nigeria has since her independence consciously opted for soft power or cultural diplomacy as the goal 
of her foreign policy.  This choice meant that Nigeria was determined to foster common cultural ties with other 
African States, and identify with the rest of the world.  
In pursuance of principles i and iv stated above, Nigeria at independence joined the international machinery for 
the resolution, management and prevention of conflicts likely to threaten international peace and security. To this 
end, she participated actively in the Congo’s peace keeping mission from 1960 to 1964. The Congo peace-
keeping exercise marked Nigeria’s entry into the global efforts towards the resolution of conflicts; today, Nigeria 
is the fourth largest troop contributing nation in the world, besides India, Pakistan and Bangladesh to UN peace-
keeping missions. In spite of these multilateral efforts, the bitterness that had developed among the Congolese 
did not clear even with the civil war. As the UN pulled out its troops in June 1964, internecine fighting continued 
in the Katanga, Kivu, Kwilu and Orientale provinces of Congo. In the process, Prime Minister C. Adoula 
resigned and was succeeded by Moise Tshombe, who eventually recruited white mercenaries to fight his 
opponents. Apparently frustrated by the activities of the mercenaries in the Congo conflict, the OAU passed 
Resolution E CM/Res.7 (IV) on December 21 1964, appealing for cessation of hostilities and disapproving all 
foreign interventions in the internal affairs of the Congo. The reasoning was that foreign intervention disturbs the 
peace and security of the African continent. Nigeria was central in the passage of this foremost resolution. The 
total cost of the Congo peace keeping operations to Nigeria was 14,785,572 pounds sterling; excluding the 
country’s contribution of $1million to the UN bonds to defray the costs of the operation. These expenses were 
very costly for an emergent African country that was less than five years old. Though the Congo operation 
represented the very first involvement of Nigeria in a multilateral military force, it is a demonstration of the 
country’s belief in international security. It is also a testimony of Nigeria’s faith in multilateral diplomacy, since 
many issues these days need global cooperation and solutions. Though an analyst like Bourke (2007) believes 
that diplomacy through multilateral organizations is attractive to smaller countries as a method of influencing 
world politics beyond their individual power, yet the founding fathers of both the League of Nations and the 
United Nations accept that diplomacy conducted "in the public domain" would preserve peace more effectively 
than traditional diplomacy conducted in secret. There is no doubt that multilateral diplomacy responds to this 
desire and Nigeria is convinced that her interest is best protected through multilateral institutions. 
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3. Nigeria’s Military Engagements 
Since joining the UN in 1960, Nigeria has remained unequivocally committed to the goals, principles and 
objectives of the Organization. Over the years, Nigeria has consistently made substantial contributions towards 
the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security.  Beginning with the Mission in the Republic 
of Congo in 1960, Nigerian armed battalions had served in many other UN regional peace-keeping missions 
around the world.  Currently, Nigeria has over 6,020 (six thousand and twenty) troops serving under UN 
mandate in various theatres of conflict (Ashore 2103).  Nigeria’s commitment to global peace, security and 
stability has been conducted at enormous costs, both in human and material terms, which even “major powers 
have often found prohibitive and politically toxic” (Uhomoibhi 2012: 124). 
Besides the initial Congo military peace keeping, Nigeria has spear-headed other robust military and diplomatic 
engagements to restore and maintain peace and stability in a number of African countries. Under the auspices of 
the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU), Nigeria’s military forces were deployed in Chad in 1981/82 
and Rwanda in 1994. The OAU's first attempts at a peace mission - the aborted 1980 and then the 1981-82 
operations in Chad - proved to be failures for the Organization and its member states. Despite verbal pledges by 
other African countries, Nigeria bore the costs of the operations. The OAU managed to contribute only 
US$400000 towards a budget of US$192 million (Profile: AU 2013). Nigeria had her regrets in the Chad 
operations. President Shehu Shagari of Nigeria complained of mounting bills that arose as a result of resolution 
of the African conflict, and which Nigeria was picking up. His lamentations fell on deaf ears:  
Our participation under the auspices of the OAU was entirely at our expense. The OAU up till today 
has not contributed anything towards our efforts in Chad although the peace–keeping force was 
supposed to be an OAU force. They asked us to continue maintaining our troops on the understanding 
that they would pay us back. Up till today, the OAU has not given us anything. Nigeria even had to 
assist the contingents from Senegal and Zaire with some logistics and food. So actually we 
maintained the OAU peace-keeping force all through and we could not afford to do so indefinitely 
(Africa Now 1982: 61).    
Shagari’s grumble was inexcusable for a country that on different occasions pledged that “Nigeria will 
have a wonderful opportunity to speak for the African continent” (Claude 1964:28); and that Nigeria 
“might fulfill her destiny as the leader of the African continent” (Jinadu & Akinsanya 1978:6).  
The Chadian conflict led to another specter of military intervention by the West, particularly France, the United 
States, and Great Britain. That conflict canceled what should have been strictly an African affair under the "Try 
Africa First" principle. The situation has changed with the transformation of OAU into African Union (AU). The 
Constitutive Act of AU recognizes the right to military intervention at least on humanitarian grounds (Sturman 
2003). Under the auspices of AU, the contribution of Nigeria towards sustainable peace in the Sudan was 
enormous. Nigeria was among the first countries to send troops to the troubled Western Region of Sudan. She 
had the largest troop contingent support to the African Union Mission in Sudan –AMIS (HRW 2006:52). 
 
Within the West African sub-region, Nigeria’s reputation as a regional leader, conciliator, and peace builder 
remains unmatched. Nigeria’s positive and successful intervention in civil wars and the restoration of democracy 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone, under the auspices of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), remains a 
hallmark of regional leadership. As Nigeria performed this regional leadership role, she also took care of 
millions of displaced civilians from these war torn countries. Nigeria remains steadfast to that commitment even 
as the demands on UN peace-keeping to contribute to international peace and security continue to grow (Nigeria 
2013). Further inquiry is vital as to what emboldened Nigeria to intervene militarily in the internal conflicts of 
these West African countries:  Liberia, Sierra Leone and now Mali. While the military interventions in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone occurred when the military was in power in Nigeria that of Mali is still on-going and is under a 
democratically elected President Goodluck Jonathan. 
3.1. Liberia 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975 with the aim to 
economically integrate and develop the sub-region. An internal civil war erupted in Liberia in 1989 and lasted 
till 1997. The attack on the Nigerian embassy by Charles Tailor’s troops on the pretext that the embassy 
harbored Samuel Doe’s soldiers must have moved Nigeria into a military action. Following a recommendation 
from the ECOWAS Mediation Committee, an ECOMOG contingent was deployed in Liberia on the 24th August 
1990. Many reasons have been advanced as to what led Nigeria into military intervention in Liberia. The 
personality disposition of the Nigerian military leader, General Babangida comes to mind. Babangida’s image of 
himself as a great leader that must keep a friend, Samuel Doe, in power was significant in committing Nigerian 
troops into Liberia (Adigbuo & Opone 2010). Besides, Babangida warned his West African compatriots that 
humanitarian intervention in Liberia was a necessity:  
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             Nigeria has no territorial ambition in Liberia or anywhere else. We are in Liberia because events in 
the country have led to the massive destruction of property, the massacre by all the warring parties 
of thousands of innocent civilians including those foreign nations, women and children some of 
whom had sought sanctuary in the churches, mosques, diplomatic missions, hospitals and under Red 
Cross protection contrary to all recognized standard of civilized behavior and international ethics 
and decorum. To those involved in false historical comparisons, intellectual intoxication and 
phantom analysis, I ask, should Nigeria and all responsible countries in the sub-region stand and 
watch the whole of Liberia turned into one mass grave yard (Adigbuo & Opone 2010)? 
Babangida's sermon quoted above is a re-assertion of the conclusion reached by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty. In its report, The Responsibility to Protect, the Commission declared that 
“millions of human beings remain at the mercy of civil wars, insurgencies, state repression and state collapse”. 
“What is at stake here … [is] delivering practical protection for ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because 
their states are unwilling or unable to protect them” (ICISS 2001). The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine 
is the enabling principle that first obligates individual states and then the international community to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Thus, R2P refers to a set 
of principles based on the idea that sovereignty is not a privilege, but a responsibility (UNRIC 2013). At the 
World Summit in 2005 the UN member states included R2P in the Outcome Document. The following year, in 
April 2006, the UN Security Council formalized its support of the R2P by reaffirming the provisions of the 
paragraphs from the World Summit document (UNRIC 2013). The pursuit of R2P is invariably a promotion of 
human rights, an outline significant in the calculating eyes of liberalism. Yet its achievement is resisted by 
realists, who see the promotion and protection of state sovereignty as overriding. Thus, the promotion of R2P as 
a form of human rights is primarily a political problem with international implications. The issue is not whether 
there exists the need to protect populations from the hazards of war, starvation and genocide; the problem is how 
and to what extent a military intervention violates a state’s territorial integrity and its right to unfettered domestic 
jurisdiction. In this regard, R2P will eternally remain a political issue shrouded in controversies.  
Despite the controversies that bedevil R2P, Nigeria was assertive in its regional protector roles in the West 
African sub-region. Babangida as Nigeria’s military head of state declared his country’s preparedness to accept 
all the challenges associated with regional protection. Not surprisingly, Nigeria provided bulk of the troops and 
80% of the resources and virtually all the commanders. He further affirmed that: 
                           Nigeria would continue to remain vigilant and concerned about events happening in our sub-
region. Nigeria has no apology to make when we take it upon ourselves as our burden duty and 
solemn responsibility to help resolve the causes of instability in our sub-region. The rule of non-
intervention is not to be used as an excuse for the abdication of responsibility for each other’s 
welfare. We are proud Nigeria agreed to commit so much of her scarce human and material 
resources towards the ensuring of the return of peace and order to Liberia (Babangida 1991:10). 
Between January 1991 and November 1996, the Security Council adopted fifteen resolutions on the Liberian 
conflict. Almost every resolution and statement commended the Nigerian-led ECOWAS for its efforts and asked 
the international community to support the sub-regional organization financially, and requested African troops to 
contribute troops to the ECOMOG contingents. While the rebel factions were reprimanded for war crimes, no 
such condemnation went to Nigeria or ECOWAS for any unilateral military intervention. From the foregoing, 
the Security Council’s stand affirmed the legality of the ECOWAS action in Liberia. It is a confirmation of the 
right of humanitarian intervention. The Security Council’s approach to this Liberian case is a confirmation that 
an intervention taken outside the authority of the UN Charter could indeed be legal. The Liberian case was a 
watershed in international peace enforcement and should be considered as the first authentic case of 
humanitarian intervention in post-Cold War era (Levitt. 2005). Nigeria sent a division of its army into Liberia 
(Musa 2010:299). 
3.2. Sierra Leone 
This conflict dates from March 1991 when fighters of the Revolutionary United Front (RUFF) launched a war 
from the east of the country near the border with Liberia to overthrow the government. With the support of the 
Military Observer Group of ECOWAS, Sierra Leone's army tried at first to defend the government but, the 
following year, the army itself overthrew the government. Another coup d’état was staged in May 1997, and a 
section of the Sierra Leone army– the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) - led a coup against the 
incumbent President Kabbah, who subsequently fled into exile in neighbouring Guinea.  Nigeria-led ECOWAS 
intervened to terminate the coup d’état the same year. In 1998, ECOWAS Multilateral Armed Forces intervened 
in the troubled Sierra Leone conflict. Following a nine-day offensive and bombardments of Freetown, Nigerian 
military forces succeeded in toppling the military junta by taking control of Freetown and reinstated President 
Kabbah (Vann 1998).   
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Bill Vann, gave an insight as to Nigeria’s motive in this second military intervention in what many regarded an 
internal affair of Sierra Leone: 
               This is the second major intervention by Nigerian forces in West Africa in the guise of peace-keepers. 
ECOMOG was created as the vehicle for Nigeria's intervention into the eight-year-long civil war in 
Liberia. It began its Liberian intervention in 1990… In Sierra Leone, the stated mission of the Nigerian-
dominated peace-keepers was to restore the country's elected president Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to 
power. Kabbah was overthrown on May 25 of last year [1997]. In reality, Nigeria had grown 
increasingly impatient with the junta's stalling on an accord reached last October calling for the 
disarming and demobilization of both the junta's forces and militias backing Kabbah, and the 
reinstatement of Kabbah's government by April 22 1998 (Vann 1998). 
Following Nigeria’s military interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the country assumed an internationally-
recognized role as a regional protector and the chief enforcer of constitutional order in West Africa. Interestingly, 
these roles were executed whilst the country was ruled by corrupt and despotic military regimes. What is today 
considered as the freest and most transparent election in the country, presumably won by Moshood Abiola, was 
annulled and the apparent winner subsequently imprisoned. While Abiola was in imprison, hundreds of other 
opposition leaders, trade union officials, journalists and accused military opponents of the regimes were also 
tortured and imprisoned. To retain power, the military regimes of Babangida and Abacha resorted to mass arrests, 
terror and executions, such as the 1995 hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his associates, as well as assassinations, 
as in the case of Abiola's wife. Abiola finally died in detention just as his release from prison was announced. 
It is not in doubt that Nigeria has used ECOWAS as a regional security vehicle. In this self- assigned role, 
Nigeria has provided strong leadership in her efforts at ensuring peace and stability across the West African sub-
region. “At the peak of Nigeria’s involvement in peace-making efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone …some 
12,000 armed personnel from Nigeria were deployed. In these two operations Nigeria spent about US$12 billion” 
(Uhomoibhi 2012:123-124). 
3.3. Mali 
Mali is a former French colony, with about 3,000 French citizens living there, plus thousands more living in 
neighboring countries of Africa. Hitherto, it had been seen by many Western analysts as the epitome of 
democracy and stability in Africa; but that epithet vanished the moment the country was lately plunged into 
disorder after a military coup in March 2012 that left a power vacuum in Bamako, the state capital. Much of 
Mali’s problem can be traced to the Libya war in 2011. After the defeat of Moammar Gadhafi, thousands of his 
African recruits returned to their home countries, including Mali. Expectantly, they took along a massive arsenal 
of heavy weapons, which re-invigorated the rebel Tuareg movement in northern Mali. The Tuaregs are a 
disenfranchised minority ethnic group in Northern Mali that had sought for independence from Mali, for some 
years and particularly in 2012.  Tuaregs are Islamists and semi-nomadic.  
The Islamist fundamentalists, identified as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), launched a major 
offensive, and by April of 2012 had captured northern Mali; they grew stronger after gaining military victories 
first against the Malian army and then against the independent Tuareg movement, the National Movement for the 
Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). AQIM and other Islamist groups, like Ansar al Din, began implementing a 
severe brand of Sharia law in the break-away northern territory. The AQIM jihadist has been particularly brutal 
to women, many of whom have been raped or forced into marriage and prostitution (Masters 2013). AQIM does 
not only operate in Mali; besides reports from Nigeria, the Governments of Algeria, Niger and United States 
have confirmed close association between Northern Nigeria’s fundamentalist group-Boko Haram - and AQIM.  
"There is no doubt that there is confirmed information that shows a link between Boko Haram and AQIM (Al 
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), and it consists primarily of the training given to elements of Boko Haram," 
Mohammed Bazoum postulated at a regional security summit in Mauritania's capital. Some of the bombers in 
Nigeria received training here in the Sahel, Bazoum declared (Bazoums 2013).   
What are the AQIM’s objectives in associating with Nigeria’s Boko Haram? AQIM claims that it has provided 
Boko Haram with weapons, training, and other support. Pham observed that Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud (also 
known as Abdelmalek Droukdel), the emir of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the head of al Qaeda's 
North African franchise stated that his group would provide Boko Haram with weapons, training, and other 
support in order to expand its own reach into Sub-Saharan Africa not only to gain "strategic depth," but also to 
"defend Muslims in Nigeria and stop the advance of a minority of Crusaders (Pham 2012). 
An additional sign of AQIM involvement in Nigeria is Boko Haram's adoption of new tactics of violence. For 
example, Boko Haram now employs suicide attacks, something not previously seen in Nigeria. On June 16, 2011, 
Boko Haram demonstrated a significant and ominous tactical and operational upgrade in its capabilities when it 
launched a suicide attack using a vehicle-borne IED (improvised explosive devices). Believed to be the first 
suicide attack in Nigeria, the operation targeted the Inspector General of the Nigerian Police Force, whose 
convoy the terrorist followed into the police headquarters compound in the federal capital of Abuja. Security was 
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able to detain the suspect vehicle, but the explosion nevertheless killed two bystanders and was large enough to 
destroy several dozen police vehicles parked nearby. In fact, the incident showed that far from being a spent 
force, Boko Haram had adopted one of the deadliest instruments in the jihadist arsenal and had demonstrated that 
it was now capable of carrying out attacks far from its usual areas of operation (Pham 2012). Association with 
Boko Haram has proven to be a significant development for AQIM. Today, the linkages between AQIM and 
Boko Haram are probably the most worrisome in terms of the indications that they are likely sharing funds, 
training and explosive materials (Flood 2013). 
It is in the strength of this unholy alliance between Boko Haram and AQIM that Nigeria is intervening militarily 
in Mali. Meanwhile, the Nigerian Senate gave a constitutional consent to the deployment of Nigerian military 
troops to Mali. The action of the upper legislative chamber was in response to a letter it received from the 
President, asking it to give consent to the 1,200 Nigerian troops he had deployed to Mali for a peace-keeping 
operation. The 1999 Constitution on which the President’s letter is based stipulates as follows:  
               Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (4) of this section, the President, in consultation  with the 
National Defence Council, may deploy members of the armed forces of the Federation on a limited 
combat duty outside Nigeria if he is satisfied that the national security is under imminent threat or 
danger: 
              Provided that the President shall, within seven days of actual combat engagement, seek the consent of 
the Senate and the Senate shall thereafter give or refuse the said consent within 14 days (Oluwole 2013). 
The President’s letter to the Senate, dated 16th January, 2013 [and tagged, “Notification to the Senate on the 
deployment of members of the Armed Forces on a limited combat duty to Mali and request for consent”,] was 
read by the Senate President, David Mark. President Jonathan specifically requested  in the letter that: 
                  Having satisfied myself that our national security is under imminent threat of danger as a result of the 
crises in Northern Mali, I, in consultation with the National Defence Council, approved the 
deployment of a contingent of 1,200 members of the armed forces to serve in the African-led force in 
Mali for limited combat duties. 
President Jonathan affirmed that Nigeria was not acting unilaterally by sending combat troops to Mali. Rather, 
the deployment of Nigerian troops was in keeping “with Security Council Resolution 2085 (2012) and is 
necessitated by the need to combat armed and terrorist groups including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magrb (AQIM) 
and their activities, as well as the proliferation of weapons, from within and outside the region with grave 
consequences on the security and stability in the northern parts of Mali and beyond, including Nigeria”. The 
attention of the senate was further  drawn to the respective resolutions of the Security Council on the crisis in 
Mali, particularly resolution 2071 (2012) which declared its readiness to respond to Mali’s request for 
international military force; Mali’s request to ECOWAS for military assistance and ECOWAS’s letter of 
28th September,2012 to the UN Secretary General, requesting a Security Council resolution authorizing the 
deployment of a stabilization force in Mali under Chapter VII mandate of the United Nations Charter”, the letter 
added. 
In endorsing the presidential request, the Senate President, David Mark, observed that: “The situation is such that 
if we don’t get involved, we may not be able to cope with the consequences and it is on that basis I think we 
should act and act fast. I believe that the request is in order and our troops had performed extremely well any 
time they go outside this country” (Punch Jan 18 2013). The request for a military intervention was subsequently 
endorsed by the Senate, though there were calls to tailor Nigeria’s foreign policy to achieve the economic 
objectives of the state. Be it as may, it is against the background of the desire to halt the advance of Islamic 
terrorists in Mali and return the country to order, that Nigeria has at January 2013 committed about $34million 
(about N7billion) towards the immediate deployment of its troops to Mali. President Jonathan made this known 
at the Donors’ Conference organized at the end of the 20th Ordinary Session of the African Union Summit in 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It then follows that Nigeria is not in Mali to assist France in fighting the terrorists. 
Nigeria, in the words of her Foreign Minister, Olugbenga Ashiru, is assisting “in restoring Mali’s territorial 
integrity, to root out terrorists and other criminals, and to prevent Mali becoming a safe haven and training base 
for terrorists, who would come and join forces with extremists in Nigeria to cause more havoc on our people” 
(Olorunlomeru 2013). Given the continued stay of Nigeria’s troops in Mali, the cost will predictably escalate to 
billions of dollars as the country experienced in similar military operations.  
 
4. Nigeria’s Diplomatic and Military Interventions: a Critique 
There is growing consensus among nations that peace and democratic advancements are preferred alternatives to 
war and conflict. It has been realized that mere brute force even in military warfare is no guarantee for victory 
and enduring peace. Examples of Vietnam, Somali, Afghanistan, Iraq and the recent Arab uprisings attest to this 
fact. Diplomacy in this regard is the principal tool with which the world can embrace peace and resist war. This 
eulogy for diplomacy does not in any manner diminish the need for military might. Law and order even in 
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domestic setting can only be sustained with military backing. Nigeria has engaged both diplomatic and military 
instruments in the realization of its foreign policy objectives. The deployment of these two foreign policy tools 
shows that Nigeria has come of age. The interplay of diplomacy and military engagements also shows that 
diplomacy is a continuation of war by other means, just as some military strategists understand war as a 
continuation of policy by other means. There is therefore a symbiotic linkage between conventional diplomacy 
with its emphasis on negotiation, political leverage, and economic power and pure military pursuits and 
interventions. This realization is more glaring following the post 9-11 diplomacy, which today is confronted with 
a reality that no state has monopoly of violence and that non-state actors, like Al Qaida, Taliban, Boko Haram, 
have negotiated themselves into political space as agents of terror, requiring a different approach to deal with 
them. This realization has made the Nigerian government to extend an olive branch to Boko Haram in the form 
of amnesty promise. Nigeria is militarily intervening in Mali due to Boko Haram’s unholy wedlock with AQIM.  
Nigeria’s advocacy for continental and global peace has taken great tolls on the country. The country’s insistence 
on peace and good neighbourliness in the African continent and especially, the West African sub-region has 
placed Nigeria’s core interests in jeopardy (Adigbuo 2011). By placing Africa at the centre of its foreign policy, 
Nigeria has unwittingly made a deliberate choice to pursue peace irrespective of the cost. It is on record that 
Nigeria has never attacked any neighbouring state and even when the Republic of Cameroon laid claim to 
Nigeria’s oil rich Bakassi Peninsula, Nigeria accepted the verdict of the International Court of Justice and 
handed the territory over to Cameroon in the spirit of good neighbourliness (Adigbuo 2011). Till date, the local 
population of Bakassi is almost hundred percent Nigerian; it is a statement of fact that no country has voluntarily 
given an inch of its territory to another state (Adigbuo 2012). In pursuit of international peace, Nigeria is rated 
the world’s fourth largest contributor of troops to the U N peace keeping force. Nigeria’s 53 years of existence is  
loaded with the assistance of other African states. This is a foreign policy thrust that has outlived regime changes. 
Even when the country’s economic fortunes dwindled, Nigeria’s commitment to the total emancipation and 
development of the whole of Africa was unwavering. Nigeria’s aid to African states has been without strings – 
something unusual in the dispensation of foreign aid in the comity of nations. During the 1970’s oil crisis, 
Nigeria sold petroleum products to many African states at subsidized prices.  
Many Nigerian professionals had been sent to other African states on technical aids corps to enhance their 
human capital development. Quite significantly, Nigeria helped in dismantling apartheid in South Africa, and 
worked assiduously for the independence of Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique and Namibia; Nigeria supported 
nationalist fighters and other Frontline States during the crusade for political independence of these countries. 
Many South African blacks were offered scholarships to study in Nigeria (Adigbuo 2005). In these perilous 
times when the world is afflicted by economic downturn, Nigeria continues to assist African states.  While 
Nigerians complain of incessant electricity outages, their country supplies uninterrupted energy to Niger and 
Benin Republics. This again demonstrates, rightly or wrongly, Nigeria’s preparedness to assist her sister states, 
no matter its internal challenges (Esiedesa 2012). In Africa, Nigeria is still unrelenting in charting a new 
development course through the New Partnerships for African Development (NEPAD), and has gone ahead to 
promote South-South co-operation and rejuvenated non-aligned nations bent on a new international economic 
order. In these efforts, Nigeria accepts the UN as the vehicle for the realization of that economic order. 
Politically, Nigeria has reversed coup d’états and instability in Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea Bissau and 
Guinea; Nigeria’s military adventures in Liberia, Sierra Leone and now Mali speak volumes.  But what has 
Nigeria gained in all these efforts? 
It is obvious that many African states look at Nigeria with suspicion. Rather than support Nigeria in the search 
for a viable continent, Nigeria to them is a nation with imperial ambition that must be stopped. There is some 
basis for this assertion.  Consider, in this regard, the case of Angola where Nigeria invested billions of dollars 
during the struggle for the country’s liberation. Nigeria asked the Angolans for fishing rights after its struggle in 
getting the MPLA-led government recognized, in the expectation that Nigeria’s “gifts” would make them accede 
to the request. The Angolans refused. Again, when Nigeria asked to extend the Nigerian Airways flight to 
Lusaka because the Lagos–Luanda route alone was not profitable, the Angolans refused (Adigbuo 2005). Late in 
1977 most African states refused to withdraw their support for Niger’s candidature to the United Nations 
Security Council after Nigeria had announced her interest in the seat (Adigbuo 2012). In that quest for a UNSC 
seat, Nigeria’s relative strength could not by itself guarantee it support in Africa. Has Nigeria fared better from 
South Africa? A few years ago many Nigerian journalists who wanted to attend the World Association of 
Newspapers Congress held in that country were denied visas on flimsy grounds. Neither can one easily forget 
how Wole Soyinka, Nigeria’s Nobel laureate, was almost turned back at the Oliver Tambo Airport some years 
ago because he was said to be over 70 (Ayodele 2012). Nigeria’s plight is worsened by world public opinion. 
Nigeria has been a victim of Hollywood for quite some time. Nigerians were portrayed in 2010 as less than 
humans to the world with the release of the Hollywood film “District 9” produced by Sony Corporation. 
Nigeria’s image was further battered as the CNN and a Canadian film industry released images of How to Rob a 
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Bank, and “419 scam” respectively (Iyorwuese 2011). Nigeria is a country once colonized by the imperial west; 
the colonial legacy led to a devastating civil war and three decades of military dictatorship; as it struggles 
towards stability, its zeal is further confronted with profiling and denigration by the same imperial West. 
Besides the issues of colonialism, Nigeria is on the other hand a victim of its creation. The country has not’ like 
other nations, conducted her interventionist policies in a principled manner. Contributions of Nigeria to UN 
Peace-keeping operations have largely been altruistic. Moreover, in the face of ravaging poverty in the country, 
it is questionable how Nigerian leadership commits huge resources to Peace Support Operations (PSO). Some 
observers have postulated that Nigeria has nothing to reap from her interventionist operations. This issue was 
brought home as the presidential request for the deployment of Nigerian troops to Mali was tabled before the 
Senate. Senator Chris Anyanwu suggested to her colleagues that Nigeria cannot continue to be father Christmas. 
She postulated that China that contributed nothing to the restoration of peace in Liberia had taken over the 
country; according to her, the situation where Nigeria would fight to restore peace and order in a particular 
country only for another country to take over it in terms of business investment must stop. “We are not just 
sending troops but carrying the entire financial burden, we have young people looking for jobs, we must move 
with mindset in our foreign policy (Balogun 2013).  
The view that Nigeria has not gained from the numerous military interventions was painfully endorsed by 
Nigeria’s Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Air Chief Marshal Paul Dike in 2010. Speaking to a paper entitled, “An 
Overview of the Nigerian Armed Forces’ Participation in Peace Support Operations” at an international seminar, 
the CDS regretted that in spite of her laudable and selfless sacrifice, Nigeria had mostly reaped pains without 
getting the benefits of her unparalleled investment in regional and global peace and security. The CDS revealed 
at the occasion that Nigeria has, so far, spent billions of dollars in the last five decades in her active pursuit of 
global peace, in addition to losing 2,000 men in the process. Dike attributed this sad phenomenon to absence of a 
national policy which has made national planning difficult. Thus, Nigeria has no national policy on military 
interventions that defines the strategy of the nation’s participation. Consequently, Nigeria has been participating 
in peace-keeping operations without clear political and economic objectives and without exit options (Agbambu, 
2010). 
The other side of this critique lies in the quality of leadership offered by President Jonathan in the on-going Mali 
intervention. Nigeria’s foreign policy towards Mali has been criticized for an inept leadership within West Africa. 
This ineptitude arose principally out of the personal weakness of Jonathan’s foreign policy, particularly where 
many regard Nigeria’s sphere of influence.  According to the analysts, it was Nigeria’s culpable absence from 
the field which ‘allowed’ France to take the lead in blocking the advance of Al-Qaeda-linked jihadists in Mali 
last year, a major embarrassment for West Africa and for Africa in general. To these analysts, Jonathan had 
failed to assert sufficient African independence against the French. In effect, President Jonathan now shares 
common interest with the Western powers (Fabricius 2013). 
 
5. Conclusion 
Nigeria from 1960 has deployed both diplomatic and military instruments towards the execution of her foreign 
policy objectives. Within the African and the West African sub-region, the Nigerian state has shown a 
commitment to good-neighborliness, a principle consistent with the internationally acclaimed “territorial 
integrity norm” which discourages infringement on the sovereignty and physical boundaries of nation-states 
(Zacher 2001). By accepting the principle of non-intervention by states, Nigeria implicitly endorsed Article 2(4) 
of the United Nations Charter which stipulates that “all members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force, against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”. In accordance with this provision, a state should 
not intervene in the internal affairs of another state.  This accounts for Nigeria’s longstanding reluctance to 
employ unilateral military force to achieve its foreign policy goals. In a way, this explains Nigeria’s willingness 
to participate in the international judicial process and implement the ICJ’s unpopular ruling on the Bakassi 
Peninsula. The acceptance of the ICJ ruling demonstrates Nigeria’s commitment to international law and order. 
It is the height of Nigeria’s recognition of diplomatic norms that had in some instances ran contrary to the 
country’s core national interests. Nigeria’s acceptance of the prescribed diplomatic norms is taking place in a 
world where many states do not adhere to those norms and as this study has revealed, the principle of non 
intervention is presently questioned by the practice of nation-states. In recognition of the age long violation of 
“non intervention principle” by nation-states, Thomas Frank pronounced a death sentence on Art 2:4 of the UN 
Charter (Frank 1970). The death sentence must have provoked Nigeria to jettison this principle though not in its 
entirety. In 2013, Nigeria is militarily in Mali though it is doubtful whether the Nigerian soldiers are trained in 
counter-terrorism. As the Cold War ended, she was in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Contradictions and domestic 
challenges in Nigeria have made the military option a very costly exercise. This calls for caution at least in two 
dimensions. First, there must be an assured commitment of interests and an exit strategy; a commitment of 
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interest assumes that the potential benefits must justify the costs and sacrifices involved in military interventions. 
Second, Nigeria’s allies, particularly in Africa, must expand their efforts with a proper measure of “burden 
sharing” in peace keeping expenses. The obligation to cooperate with Nigeria in burden sharing arises solely 
from the fact that in the twenty first century, security within the West African sub-region must be sought by all 
countries working in concert and not by individual states acting unilaterally.  
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